This paper reviews recent evidence on the trends in household well-being 
1

I. Introduction
Does the Dollar and Kraay (2000: 27) view, that 'anyone who cares about the poor should favor the growth-enhancing policies of good rule of law, fiscal discipline, and openness to international trade' apply to Africa in the 1990s? Or was the growth path the reforms induced characterized by increasing inequality, denying benefits to the poorest (Stewart, 1995; Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999; Forsyth, 2000) . There is no simple answer to this question, given the many changes that affected people's lives and livelihoods in Africa during the 1990s. In addition to economic and political reforms, external opportunities and constraints shifted during the decade, with many countries experiencing sharp movements in their terms of trade. Some countries faced internal civil strife and political instability. Others had to endure severe droughts. And there have been serious health shocks, such as AIDS and malaria, affecting rich and poor alike. The effects of these changes on growth and poverty were further conditioned by the private and public endowments households possessed-their physical assets, their human capital, and their access to infrastructure and public services. This complexity makes for considerable debate about the relationship between policy, growth and poverty in Africa-a debate that was previously not always well served with hard evidence.
It is by now widely accepted that economic growth is at least a necessary condition for sustainable poverty reduction (Kanbur, 2001 ). Yet, historically growth rates have been low in Africa. Reviewing the literature of cross-country growth studies Collier and Gunning (1999) conclude that the explanations for this phenomenon are to be found in geography (the landlocked, tropical character of many countries), in macroeconomic policies (notably economic policy volatility and a lack of openness to international trade), and in microeconomic policies, which have disproportionately taxed rural producers, eroded social capital, undermined the provision of public services, and resulted in a retreat into subsistence by rural producers.
Despite these important insights from cross country analysis , the reasons for 'Africa's growth and poverty paradox' (Easterly and Levine, 1997) remain much debated. The limited number of countries, and the high correlation between the explanatory variables, means that the findings are often highly sensitive to the specification of the estimation model. Cross-country studies typically examine average long term growth, and are therefore unable to deal with some of the important growth dynamic issues, such as the deterioration in African growth after the 1960s, and the tendency for growth in Africa to be episodic in nature (Collier and Gunning, 1999) . The use of country-wide averages in this literature also limits what can be said about the distributional dimension of growth, particularly its relation to poverty. And the fact that the cross country evidence often emphasizes immutable factors (such as geography and linguistic or ethnic fragmentation), limits its relevance to policy formulation in any particular country.
Collier and Gunning also find that the messages from household-level analysis are different from those of the cross-country literature. Among the factors explaining poverty at the household level 'disease and climate feature most prominently , and these are largely omitted in the aggregate analysis' (Collier and Gunning, 1999: 83) . They hint that these growth-retarding risks might explain the 'Africa dummy' in growth regressions 1 . Also, the lack of credit appears more constraining to rural households than would be suggested by the aggregate growth models. It is unlikely that cross country analysis alone will resolve the growth-poverty issue (Brock and Durlauf, 2000; Bourguignon, 2000; Deininger and Okidi, 2001 ).
Ravallion (2001) also calls for a more microeconomic approach to the analysis of policies, growth and poverty. Using household survey data in a sample of 50 developing countries and 120 spells 2 of poverty change, he estimates that on average the growth elasticity of headcount poverty is -2.5. 3 But that average masks a great deal of variation across countries-variations rela ted to the level and trends in income inequality. Inequality impinges on the growth-poverty relationship in three ways. First, high initial inequality can harm subsequent growth, though the body of evidence on this is somewhat mixed. 4 Second, high in itial inequality reduces the poverty-reducing potential of growth. This is because even when income distributions remain unchanged, poor groups gain from overall growth roughly in proportion to their initial share in the national pie. The higher the initial inequality, the lower the share of the poor, and the less poverty reduction is generated by a growth in mean income. 5 Third, changes in inequality will modify the poverty reducing effects of mean income growth. Among the countries experiencing increasing living standards in his sample, Ravallion finds that the annual reduction in poverty was only 1.3 percent in countries where inequality was rising-compared with 9.6 percent in the countries experiencing falling inequality. He concludes:
'These observations point to the importance of more micro, country-specific, research on the factors determining why some poor people are able to take up the opportunities afforded by an expanding economy-and so add to its expansion-while others are not. Individual endowments of physical and human capital have rightly been emphasized in past work, and suggest important links to policy. Other factors that may well be equally important have received less attention, such as location, social exclusion and exposure to uninsured risk. ' Ravallion (2001 ' Ravallion ( : 1813 This monograph applies this advice to Africa by utilizing the much-improved data base in the region. It addresses three central questions:
• First, what does recent household survey evidence tell us about the evolution of overall poverty and inequality in Africa and its relation with economic growth (and stagnation)? • Second, moving beyond the national averages, did particular population groups or geographical regions gain or lose from the episodes of reform-induced growth?
• Third, among the wide array of disparate events and factors affecting growth and poverty trends, which emerge as key in explaining changes in income distribution and poverty?
The monograph builds on the results of a series of Poverty Dynamics country studies 6 which exploit household survey data in Africa covering the 1990s. It examines the main factors behind observed poverty trends by first taking a macro-perspective, linking the historical changes in income poverty in our sample countries to changes in economic environment-the macroeconomic and sectoral policy frameworks, and the institutional settings. It then exploits the survey data to greater depth by taking a micro-perspective. This assesses how households (and poor households in particular) have been affected by the events of the 1990s, distinguishing between the effects of policies and of shocks. When available, household panel data have been used (Ethiopia and Uganda) , though important insights were also obtained from repeated cross sections (Zimbabwe, Ghana, and Madagascar). We highlight the main insights emerging from this sample of micro-econometric country studies in Africa .
Considering that well-being is multifaceted, the paper begins with a review (in section II) of the changes that have occurred in income, education, nutrition and health. We first examine how these four different dimensions of well-being have evolved during the 1990s at the aggregate level. We then move beyond the aggregates and examine their evolution across income quintiles, 6 The selection of countries was based on the availability of comparable measures of consumption, and includes Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mauritania, Nigeria, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The paper 4 focusing particularly on how welfare of the poorest groups fared. The section concludes by describing the evolution of overall income poverty and inequality, and its relation with economic growth. In the two subsequent sections we seek to explain the systematic changes in income distribution and poverty in Africa, taking both macro (Section III) and micro (Section IV) perspectives. Concluding observations are made in the final section.
II. Living standards during the 1990s
To set the scene, Table 1 reports four basic measures of well-being: private consumption, primary school enrollment, child malnutrition, and child mortality. The first and obvious point to note is that living standards are very low in these countries. By the close of the decade, no country enjoyed an annual per capita consumption in excess of $500, and in Ethiopia it was just $86. All countries fall far short of universal primary enrollment, and in some (for example, Ethiopia) primary enrollments are unacceptably low. Malnutrition is also a very serious problem, especially in Ethiopia and Madagascar. In Ethiopia, about two thirds of children exhibit signs of stunting or long-term malnutrition (defined as the percentage of children with low height for age compared with a reference population). Even in Ghana, Mauritania and Zimbabwe, there is evidence of stunting in about a quarter of the population under 5 years of age. Perhaps the most poignant indicator of the very low welfare levels of these countries is the incidence of child deaths. Under-age-five mortality exceeds 100 (per 1000) in all countries. In Zambia , almost one in five children fail to survive to their fifth birthday. Too many African children are dying needlessly.
also draws on an analysis of time series data from the Demographic and Health Su rveys. References to these Poverty Dynamics studies are given in the bibliography. (1) Growth rates calculated based on least squared method, which is less sensitive to the choice of base and terminal period. Child malnutrition defined as the percentage of children stunted, i.e. z-score of height for age which is less than -2; the reference periods for these figures approximate to those in column 1; (4) Child mortality under 5 (per 1000 live births); the reference periods approximate to those in column 1. Source: World Bank data and country studies under Dynamics of Poverty study.
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Second, there are differences in the changes in these indicators over time. In four countries economic living standards appear to have improved. But in Madagascar, average real consumption remained more or less unchanged, while it fell sharply in Nigeria, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Similarly, improvements in primary school enrollment in Ethiopia, Ghana, Mauritania and Uganda contrast with unsatisfactory outcomes in Zambia. Ethiopia and Mauritania experienced sharp reductions in long-term malnutrition, but there was little progress elsewhere. In all countries the long term downward trend in child mortality appears to have continued through the decade, except in Zimbabwe, a result probably related to the AIDS epidemic (among other factors), and in Nigeria . Also the 2000/1 round of the Uganda Demographic and Health Survey suggests that child mortality in Uganda has been unchanged (and possibly even increased) since 1995 (UDHS, 2001 serve as a reminder that focusing only on one dimension of well-being can be misleading when tracking poverty dynamics over time (World Bank, 2000) .
Inequality in human development
The indicators in Table 1 are averages for the population as a whole. We now review the distribution of these indicators across the populations, identifying especially changes in the welfare of poorer households. We begin with the human development indicators. Primary school enrollments are particularly low in Ethiopia (Table 2) , and to a lesser extent in Mauritania. The poorest households in these countries typically do not enroll their children in primary schools.
But there have been major strides in raising primary enrollments during the decade in Ghana, Madagascar, Mauritania, and Uganda. And where there have been education enrollment gains, they have included the poor. Only Zambia seems to have lost ground. 1996 1997 1992 1998 1993 1999 1987 1995 1992 1997 1991 1998 1991 1996 Poorest quintile  15  17  54  70  29  53  19  25  54  80  57  50  78  81  Second quintile  15  24  69  81  43  65  25  41  63  87  67  62  82  85  Third quintile  18  27  73  86  59  64  29  49  69  88  75  69  84  87   Fourth quintile  21  28  77  87  60  68  32  50  75  87  82  75  86  89   Richest quintile  30  33  87  90  60  78  50  60  86  89  86  81  89 Because income data were not collected in the Demographic and Health Surveys, Sahn et al. (1999 Sahn et al. ( , 2000a ) constructed a proxy index for income based on assets and household amenities.
This enabled them to examine trends in child health capabilities (survival and nutrition) by wealth class. The poorest 20 percent of the populations appear to be the worst affected by the deterioration in pre-school child nutrition (Table 3) . Stunting (measured by height-for-age) has deteriorated among the poorest in three countries (Ghana, Senegal and Tanzania) and improved in four (Madagascar, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe). But short-run malnutrition, or wasting (measured by weight for height), has increased among the poorest quintiles of five countries (Ghana, Madagascar, Senegal, Uganda and Zimbabwe). In general, these data indicate a major problem of increased wasting during the 1990s including among the poor. This is not fully understood, and clearly calls for further investigation. 1988 1993 1992 1997 1986 1992 1991 1996 1988 1995 1992 1997 1988 1994 Height for age: Most countries have experienced declines in mortality among the poor, the exceptions being Kenya and Zambia (Table 4 ). The trends are not always uniform across wealth groups, with a widening of the mortality gap between rich and poor. The ratio of mortality levels among the poorest to the richest quintiles has increased in most cases-where mortality has been falling, it has fallen faster among the richest group. The exceptions are Zambia and Zimbabwe.
8 Year 1988 1993 1988 1993 1992 1997 1987 1995 1986 1992 1997 1991 1996 1988 1995 1992 1997 1988 Source: Sahn et al. (1999) .
Infant mortality
Income inequality
We turn now to income distribution, and to the issue of whether episodes of growth in the 1990s
in Africa were associated with changes in income inequality. Increasing reliance on markets and the withdrawal of the state might be expected to increase income inequality (people with low levels of education, and limited access to public services and markets being less likely to take advantage of the opportunities growth presents). But on the other hand, the previous tendency for the state to tax agriculture and the rural sector heavily, and the removal of such state intervention, might result in improved national income distributions.
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We present Gini coefficients, a popular measure of inequality 8 , to describe how income inequality evolved in our sample of countries (Table 5 ). All underlying 'welfare' measures 9 are based on real total household expenditures. 10 The surveys were designed to enable comparisons over time within a country, though due to different survey designs caution is warranted in making comparisons across countries. Nonetheless, the differences in the degree of income inequality in our sample of countries are striking. At one extreme, Zimbabwe has a highly unequal distribution (a Gini ratio of over 0.6), 11 reflecting unequal land distribution, a result in part of its colonial history. Income distributions in Ghana and Uganda, are far more egalitarian.
In terms of evolution, the picture is one of very little change in overall income inequality in these countries, except in Zambia . Reforms and growth have clearly not led to a significant deterioration in consumption inequality, as popular belief would hold (Forsyth, 2000) .
Nevertheless, these aggregate measures of inequality can be misleading. They may in fact mask a great deal of distributional change, an issue we review further in section IV below.
8 Recall that the Gini ratio varies from 0 (perfect income equality) to 1 (perfect inequality). The higher the value, the greater the inequality. 9 While most welfare measures are based on expenditures, we use the terms 'income' and 'consumption' interchangeably. For most countries, expenditure is normalized on the number of 'equivalent' adults in the household. In Urban Ethiopia Nigeria and Madagascar, the welfare measure is real household expenditure per capita. 10 The only exception being Rural Ethiopia (1989-95) where the welfare measure used is real household food consumption expenditure. 11 Intuitively, the Gini index of a population represents the expected income difference between two randomly selected individuals or households. From 
Trends in poverty during the 1990s
If growth episodes were not associated with significant changes in inequality, did they lead to poverty reduction? Table 6 reports poverty estimates for the countries covered by the Poverty Dynamics study. As with the inequality measures, real household consumption per adult equivalent (or in some cases, per capita) is taken as the central economic welfare measure.
Poverty lines in all cases (except Mauritania) are derived from a food consumption basket, estimated to yield a minimum caloric intake, with adjustments made for essential non-food consumption. These poverty lines are typically much higher than the Purchasing Power Parity $1/day poverty line. The average poverty incidence in 24 spells of poverty change in African countries analyzed by Ravallion (2001) was 31 percent (based on the $1/day line). This compares with (unweighted) average headcounts of 58 percent in our sample of nine spells. The countrybased poverty lines in our countries are, therefore significantly higher than the PPP$1/day benchmark. Because of differences in survey design and in the specifics of how the welfare measure and poverty lines are derived, the data in Table 6 are not comparable across countries.
But the research has been designed to ensure comparable estimates over time. 1) The two rural samples are different and not comparable. They are based respectively on six and fifteen purposively sampled rural villages for 1989-1995 and 1994-1997; urban The poverty measures we report here are derived from the familiar class of poverty indices after Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) . The general formula for these poverty measures is:
where n is the total population, q the number of poor people, y i the income (consumption) of individual i, z the poverty line, and α a 'poverty aversion' parameter. The larger is α, the greater weight is placed on the very poorest people. If α = 0, equation (1) becomes simply q/n, which is the head-count ratio , or the incidence of poverty. Estimates of the headcount (P 0 ) are reported in the first data panel of Table 6 . Setting α=2 involves taking the square of the proportionate poverty gap. This measure (P 2 ) is given in the second panel in Table 6 , and is sometimes known as the severity index. We report this index because it is sensitive to the distribution of income among the poor. It is particularly sensitive to changes in the living standards of the poorest of the poor. The data suggest the following:
• Most countries can be considered as having to deal with 'mass' poverty. Over 70 percent were estimated to be poor in Madagascar and Zambia. And 66 percent of Nigerians were estimated to be poor in 1996.
• There is no uniform trend. While consumption poverty incidence declined substantially in several countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, Mauritania and Uganda), it rose sharply in Nigeria and Zimbabwe. Poverty has fluctuated in Zambia and Madagascar, increasing marginally in the former and remaining more or less unchanged in the latter.
• Where the incidence of poverty has declined, the data suggest that the poorest sections of the population (in Lipton's phrase, the 'poorest of the poor') have also benefited. This is suggested by the significant downward trend in the severity index (P 2 ). In several cases the percentage fall in the P 2 measure was greater than that in P 0 .
Poverty, inequality and economic growth
In some cases these changes in poverty occurred in a context of economic decline (Nigeria and Zimbabwe, and Madagascar and Zambia during the earlier periods). In others they accompanied overall economic progress (Ethiopia, Ghana, Mauritania and Uganda). To shed more light on the relation between poverty, inequality and growth, Table 7 presents a decomposition of poverty incidence into two components: changes explained by changes in mean consumption (keeping the distribution of consumption unchanged); and changes arising from changing consumption distribution (with the mean kept constant). The poverty measure that is decomposed in the table is the elasticity of headcount poverty with respect to changes in mean household expenditure. 12 12 This is defined as the proportionate change in headcount poverty divided by the proportionate change in mean per capita household expenditure. For details of the method used see Kakwani and Pernia (2000) .
Overall, changes in poverty incidence are due predominantly to changes in mean expenditure (Table 7) . Where there has been economic growth, both mean and redistribution effects have the same sign, and have combined to reduce poverty (in Ghana, Mauritania and Uganda). But the mean effect largely dominates the redistribution effect. In contrast, where there has been recession, mean and redistribution effects typically have opposite signs, and the redistribution effect substantially mitigates the poverty increasing impact of lower mean incomes (Madagascar, Nigeria and Zimbabwe). Better-off groups clearly bear a heavier burden of income losses during periods of economic decline in Africa. To assess further the extent to which these episodes of growth and recession are 'pro-poor' we follow Kakwani and Pernia (2000) in defining,
where η is the observed elasticity of headcount poverty with respect to changes in mean expenditure, and η g is the elasticity of headcount poverty assuming the distribution of income did not change during the period. φ can be defined as an index of 'pro-poor growth.' Growth can be 14 considered pro-poor if φ > 1.
14 Table 8 compares estimates of φ for these seven African countries with recent experience in Asia. On the basis of this sample of countries, growth and recession episodes in Africa have tended to be pro-poor, and indeed more so than the Asian experience. Asian country estimates are simple means across years within the sub-periods shown. Sources: Table 7 ; Kakwani and Pernia (2000) .
Taking all nine spells of poverty change in our sample of African countries, we obtain a growth elasticity of poverty incidence of just -0.93 ( Figure 1 ).
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While growth is 'pro-poor', its quantitative impact on the headcount is limited in this sample. This is due to the shape of the base year distributions, since in most cases initial Ginis are low, and the distributions do not change significantly. It is a reflection of the depth of poverty-large numbers are subsisting well below the poverty line (and poverty lines are set well above modal consumption). The growth elasticity of the severity index (P 2 ), at -1.42 (with a standard error of 0.35) is higher, indicating 13 The tendency for income inequality to narrow as higher income groups bear the brunt of economic recession was also noted by Grootaert (1996) in analyzing poverty changes in Côte d'Ivoire in the 1980s. Though this does not seem to have occurred in Zambia during 1991-1996. 14 When mean household expenditures are declining, φ= η g /η, so that a recession would also be considered pro-poor if φ > 1. 15 This is simply the slope coefficient in the regression of the proportionate change in headcount poverty on the proportionate change in the survey mean. The standard error on the slope coefficient is 0.18. Note that the regression line in Figure 1 runs almost through the origin, a reflection of the fact that income inequality has been stable over this period. The historical elasticities we observe for this sample of African countries are significantly lower than that estimated by Ravallion (2001) to be typical of low-income countries (-2.5). Given the different poverty lines used (he uses the much lower benchmark of PPP$1/day) and the different method of computation, his estimates are not comparable with ours.
that growth has improved the economic wellbeing of the poorest, though not enough to take them out of poverty. As discussed above, countries with lower initial inequality typically grow more rapidly in subsequent years, and experience greater poverty impact from that growth. The experience of this (albeit small) sample of African countries is consistent with this view (Figure 2 ). The countries that had lower levels of initial inequality (as evidenced by the Gini ratios), were more likely to experience declines in poverty in subsequent years. That said, it is worth noting that the three countries with identical initial year Gini ratios (of 0.43)-Ethiopia, Mauritania, and Madagascar-experienced subsequent annual poverty changes of (respectively) -8.7, -5.0, and +0.2 percent. While the pattern across countries suggests that higher levels of inequality are associated with lower subsequent growth and poverty reduction, there is sufficient variation around this empirical regularity to counsel caution. -7.00 -4.00 -1.00 2.00 5.00 8.00 11.00 14.00
Subsequent annual percentage change in headcount poverty
Base year Gini ratio
III. Growth and systematic changes in income distribution: a macro perspective
Our review of the evidence so far suggests that growth has been pro-poor in these African countries. These changes have occurred during an era of economic policy reform, institutional change and profound internal and external shocks, such as droughts, disease, and fluctuating commodity prices. These events have effects at all levels-they influence the growth rate of the economy at large, they affect the functioning of markets and of government, they change village and community life, and they impinge directly on the lives of households and individuals.
Understanding how these changes have influenced poverty outcomes, therefore, calls for knowledge at both the macro (economy-wide) and micro (household/individual) levels. And this is the approach we take here. We first assess how macro changes (in economic and institutional environments) have affected poverty outcomes. This provides the context in which we then review (in section IV) the microeconomic evidence linking poverty outcomes to policies and shocks.
Macro-economic reforms and poverty trends
We begin by reviewing the relationship between macroeconomic policy reforms and income poverty. To do so, we elaborate and update the analysis of Demery and Squire (1997) Following Bouton et al. (1994) we calculate a macroeconomic policy index or score, based on changes in three key elements of sound macroeconomic policy: fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policy. The overall macro-policy score is a weighted average of these components, the weights being derived from international cross section growth regressions. These scores are computed for the three-year period prior to each survey, and changes in the index are then compared. The index is so computed that increases in the score (either lower negative values or higher positive values) indicate an improvement in economic policy ( Table 9 ). Details of the changes in the different policy instrument indicators, and the computations made in deriving the macro-policy score are given in Annex Table A3 . Annex Table A1 ).
Given weaknesses in the underlying survey data, we prefer not to retain two countries included in the original Demery and Squire piece (Tanzania and Kenya). For Ethiopia, Ghana and Nigeria, 16 The data used in many previous assessments were often of doubtful quality and given the lags involved in implementing the reforms, the 1990s might be a more appropriate decade to examine the growth path induced by economic policy reforms in Africa (Collier and Gunning, 1999, 101) . 17 The data used in many previous assessments were often of doubtful quality and given the lags involved in implementing the reforms, the 1990s might be a more appropriate decade to examine the growth path induced by economic policy reforms in Africa (Collier and Gunning, 1999, 101 Setting these against the trends in poverty reduction (Figure 3 ) confirms that countries achieving improvements in their macroeconomic balances in Africa typically have not experienced (in the aggregate at least) increases in consumption poverty-rather the reverse. 18 Nine of the fifteen episodes of change for which we have data indicate both macroeconomic policy improvement and subsequent poverty reduction. In the two cases where macroeconomic balances substantially deteriorated, poverty is indicated to have increased sharply. Only two of the fifteen observations (Zimbabwe, 1991-96, and Zambia , 1991-96) are in the 'wrong' quadrant in Figure 3 (improved macroeconomic policy and increased poverty).
The association between the macro-policy stance and poverty reduction does not necessarily imply any causative or direct behavioral link. 19 Rather this evidence serves to highlight the close interactions between macroeconomic policies and economic well-being at the household level.
An important feature missing from this analysis is any measure of policy persistence and consistency. 20 Collier and Gunning (1999) argue that the slow investment response to the reforms in part derives from a fear of policy reversals. Countries with a longer history of consistent policies (Ethiopia, Ghana, Mauritania and Uganda in our sample) 21 are more likely to experience growth and poverty reduction dividends from the reforms. And the macro analysis is partial in another respect-the changes in the macroeconomic accounts took place alongside other reforms-mostly of a 'structural' nature (trade liberalization, agricultural marketing reforms, 18 Ali (1998) gets quite different results, with reforms being associated with increasing poverty. This is probably due to the different poverty data sets he uses (derived from IFAD data). Our concern here has been to use only data where careful attention has been paid to over time comparability. Without further information about Ali's data, it is difficult to establish the specific reasons for the differences in results. 19 Both poverty changes and macro-policy scores might be favorably affected by a third factor, movements in the terms of trade, for example. 20 Although we track and compare three-year averages of the macropolicy stance, we do so only for the two periods prescribed by the available household surveys. 21 These countries are described by Collier and Gunning (1999: 102) as 'providing at least modest levels of social order, macroeconomic order and resource allocation.' privatization, and so on)-and changing institutional environments. Both the institutional environment and the sectoral reforms are certain to be important as well, as is illustrated by the fact that quite similar poverty reductions occurred among some of the countries despite quite different changes in their macro-economic indicators (see south-east quadrant in Figure 3 ). 
Institutional change and poverty trends
There is an accumulation of convincing empirical evidence pointing to the importance of political stability and good governance for growth and poverty reduction (Alesina and Perotti, 1994; Knack and Anderson, 1995; Collier, 1999; Collier and Gunning, 1999; World Bank, 2000) .
While the construction and consolidation of good indicators of political stability and good governance remain work in progress, the composite political risk index of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), and subsets thereof, have been frequently used by researchers to examine the effect of governance and institutional quality on growth and poverty. The composite index consists of twelve components covering different aspects of political stability (for example, government stability, internal conflict, external conflict), governance and institutional quality (for example, corruption, democratic accountability, bureaucracy quality). The key advantage of the ICRG index is its broad coverage across countries and over time (1985 to current). 23 Evaluations of the different aspects of the index are provided by a private consultancy.
We find an improvement in the political risk score during all episodes of poverty change covered by the Poverty Dynamics study. 24 In Ethiopia (1989-95 ) the improvement followed largely from reduced risk of internal and external conflict following peace agreements with Eritrea. Better overall governance (as captured by the corruption, law and order, democratic accountability and bureaucratic quality indices), as well as greater government stability and reduced risk of internal conflicts drove progress in institutional quality in Ghana (1992-98) and Uganda (1992-97).
Increased government stability was responsible for the change in Madagascar. And in Zimbabwe (1991-96) the improvement followed from reduced risk of an external conflict, a result of the end of the Cold War and the peace process in neighboring Mozambique. Greater external security is also an important factor in explaining the large improvement in the political risk score in Zambia, in addition to the substantial progress in internal political stability and security (law and order)
following the peaceful handover of power by Kenneth Kaunda in 1991 after 27 years of autocratic rule.
Plotting the changes in the average annual political risk scores of the survey years of our countries against annual changes in the observed poverty incidence (Figure 4 ) suggests that improvements in political stability and governance are generally associated with reductions in poverty, though experiences vary across countries. 25 In nine out of the thirteen episodes these improvements were accompanied by poverty reduction. In one episode we observe a modest increase in poverty (Madagascar during 1993-97) , while in the three other cases (Nigeria , Zambia during 1991-96, and Zimbabwe) the poverty increase was more pronounced. In Nigeria the 23 The different components of the ICRG political risk index (maximum scores in brackets) are government stability (12) , socio-economic conditions (12) , investment profile (12), internal conflict (12), external conflict (12), corruption (12) , military in politics (6), religion in politics (6), law and order (6), ethnic tensions (6), democratic accountability (6), bureaucracy quality (4). The maximum score is 100 with a political risk score below 49.9 indicating very high risk; a score between 50 and 59.9 high risk; 60 to 69.9 moderate risk; 70 to 79.9 low risk; and 80 or more very low risk. Similarly, a score of 49.9 percent or below on an individual risk component, would imply that the component can be considered as very high risk, a score in 50 to 59.9 percent range as high risk, and so on. For a detailed description of the ICRG rating system we refer to http://www.icrgonline.com/icrgMethods.asp. 24 In all, thirteen episodes of institutional change were examined. Political risk scores for our survey periods were not available for Mauritania and Côte d'Ivoire. 25 Using two year averages of the survey year and the year prior to the survey year to account for lags in the effect of institutional change on poverty does not change the results. Our findings are also robust to the use of a subset of the political risk indicator focusing on indicators of political stability (government stability, internal conflict, external conflict) and governance (corruption, law and order, democratic accountability and bureaucratic quality stress. This compares with above average rainfall in 1990, the year preceding the first survey.
We discuss the Zimbabwe episode of poverty increase and the role of rainfall shocks in further detail below. While our measures of political stability and the quality of governance are admittedly crude, these findings would support the general observation that increased political stability and improved governance go hand in hand with poverty reduction. Nevertheless, many difficult questions remain to be resolved. Which of the different components of institutional change (for example, political, economic, civil rights or social stability), have had the most significant impact? And what is the direction of causality and the channels through which institutional improvements and poverty reduction may affect each other (Aron, 2000) ? These fall beyond the scope of this study.
IV. Growth and systematic changes in income distribution: a micro-perspective
The evidence from the African experience covered in this study indicates that growth (and recession) have been pro-poor. Yet, this conclusion must be qualified-it is true only in an aggregate sense. Further decomposition of national inequality and poverty measures-by geographical location and socio-economic group-indicates that the aggregate statistics often mask a wide variety of experience. Some groups and regio ns gained disproportionately from the newly created opportunities following economic reforms, while others lost out or even became impoverished. Similarly, overall Gini coefficients often appear stable over time despite substantial churning within and across geographical regions as illustrated by the experience in Ghana (discussed below). This suggests that the positive association between improved macroenvironments and poverty reduction is conditioned by other factors such as location and infrastructure, households' private and public endowments, and the occurrence of shocks.
To disentangle the effects of these disparate events and factors on the different sections of African society it is tempting to use economy-wide modeling techniques. These can generate counterfactuals and provide insights into the respective impacts of policies and other shocks.
Much of the serious work to date on policy reform and poverty in Africa has relied on such modeling approaches (Bourguignon and Morrison, 1992; Sahn et al., 1997 ). Yet, despite their advantages, these approaches also have a number of important limitations. The models typically impose a strong structure which sometimes leads to questions about their realism. They are most often calibrated at one point in time. As a result, they cannot always confidently track changes over time-the economic history. Indeed, such history usually involves policy-induced structural changes in the economy that are not captured in such experiments.
Exploiting different experiences across households, this section places emphasis instead on the micro-econometric evidence emerging from the much improved and richer household survey data changes in the real exchange rate, and changes in the real world price contributed respectively 58, 9 and 11 percent (Townsend, 1999) . Over the past decade, agricultural output has recovered, averaging between 4 to 4.5 percent per annum in real terms. And this growth has played an important role in reducing poverty .
In sum, economic policy reforms in both Ethiopia and Uganda had significant effects on agricultural markets and the prices farmers received for both food and export crops. At the same time, however, the period witnessed other changes, including rainfall variation. Both Dercon to 1995. The change in household real consumption per adult is explained through a reduced form regression model with an Oaxaca-Blinder type decomposition. In this approach changes in consumption and poverty can be explained by changes in endowments over time and changes in returns to endowments. The main regressors were changes in real crop producer prices (which Dercon shows to be closely related to the macro-economic and agricultural reforms that were implemented during the period), location (proxied by distance to an urban center), access to roads, private endowments (land, labor and education), and two shock variables, rainfall and ill health. His results are summarized in Table 10 . Source: Dercon (2002) 26 Because the study is not nationally representative, the results cannot be generalized to Ethiopia as a whole. Nonetheless, the methodology used and the empirical findings provide important insights in the linkages between economic policy, growth and poverty reduction. 27 These reflect mainly changes in food crop prices. Coffee prices also improved, yet it was grown in only one of the six sampled villages, and the coffee harvest had failed that year in that particular village because of a pest attack and drought. The effect of changing export crop prices cannot be evaluated from this sample, but its importance has been assessed explicitly in the Uganda case study described below.
28 Dercon (1995) shows that the cereal marketing margins mainly improved because of the liberalization of the grain markets and only on some routes did the end of the war have a significant effect. 29 Adult education levels are extremely low, less than 1 year per adult, and they are assumed not to have changed. The effect of education as such, as opposed to changes in returns to education, has thus not been evaluated in this study. 30 As the direct effect of changing producer prices has been controlled for, changes in returns to land result from other factors such as shifts in the underlying production technology potentially induced by the reforms. Interestingly, all poor households (even those who fell into poverty)
benefited from the relative price changes that occurred. But those who escaped poverty benefited most. These findings suggest that the reforms and increased political stability substantially improved well-being of the poor, both directly through a favorable change in relative prices, and indirectly through an increase in the returns to market connectedness as determined by road infrastructure and distance to urban centers.
In addition to public endowments, such as road infrastructure and location, private endowments are also found to be important for consumption growth and poverty reduction. Increases in land holdings (through redistribution) or improvement in the quality of the land owned, and increases in adult labor reduced poverty by 14 percentage points. 35 Returns to land also increased, 36 but because the poor typically possess little (and often less fertile ) land, they profited much less than the average household from the increased returns to land. Finally, the occurrence of shocks (especially rainfall, but also illness shocks) had a large negative effect both on the growth process and poverty outcomes. If households had had access to full insurance protection from rainfall and health shocks, poverty would have declined by 42 percentage points compared with 29 percentage points in its absence. Dercon shows that the reason why households fell into poverty 31 These reflect mainly changes in food crop prices. Coffee prices also improved, yet it was grown in only one of the six sampled villages, and the coffee harvest had failed that year in that particular village because of a pest attack and drought. The effect of changing export crop prices cannot be evaluated from this sample, but its importance has been assessed explicitly in the Uganda case study described below.
32 Dercon (1995) shows that the cereal marketing margins mainly improved because of the liberalization of the grain markets and only on some routes did the end of the war have a significant effect. 33 These reflect mainly changes in food crop prices. Coffee prices also improved, yet it was grown in only one of the six sampled villages, and the coffee harvest had failed that year in that particular village because of a pest attack and drought. The effect of changing export crop prices cannot be evaluated from this sample, but its importance has been assessed explicitly in the Uganda case study described below. 34 Dercon (1995) shows that the cereal marketing margins mainly improved because of the liberalization of the grain markets and only on some routes did the end of the war have a significant effect. 35 Adult education levels are extremely low, less than 1 year per adult, and they are assumed not to have changed. The effect of education as such, as opposed to changes in returns to education, has thus not been evaluated in this study. 36 As the direct effect of changing producer prices has been controlled for, changes in returns to land result from other factors such as shifts in the underlying production technology potentially induced by the reforms.
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during this period was mainly the combined effects of the rainfall and illness shocks.
Agricultural marketing reforms are shown to have benefited even the households that lost ground during the period.
In sum, households that escaped poverty during the period not only benefited from better producer prices, they also enjoyed a more favorable location, and were endowed with good access to infrastructure and better land. Those who remained poor or who fell into poverty, did so in part because they were badly placed in terms of location and land. They were also at the receiving end of particularly bad luck-they suffered most from poor rainfall and from ill health. (2001) find that the relative coffee price changes had a powerful poverty-reducing impact, indicating that their effect was broad-based and that price changes in tradable commodities directly benefited poor producers (and not only indirectly through the labor market.) Moreover, households with higher education, more initial assets (land), better health, and better access to infrastructure (electricity) and location (distance to municipality) were far less likely than others to fall into poverty, and more likely to escape from it.
Deininger and Okidi
The results from these micro-econometric analyses of panel data point to the following factors that appear to influence the relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction:
• First, many rural households stand to benefit directly from liberalization measures, as well as increased political stability and better governance. And the gains can be substantial. In so far as liberalization measures increase producer prices, rural producers will gain, and to the extent that food marketing margins tend to decline, rural consumers will gain as well. Nonetheless, some will gain more than others, depending on the product-and consumption-mix of the household.
• Second, a household's location is key in conditioning the extent to which it will benefit from liberalization measures. Specifically, whether the household had access to infrastructure and urban markets was an immensely important factor in governing the growth in household income. It explains about half of household consumption growth and poverty reduction in Ethiopia during 1989-95, and it was also quantitatively important for growth in Uganda household income. So, connectedness to markets as captured by access to infrastructure (especially roads, but also electricity) and distance to urban centers is likely to be a major factor in determining how growth in any country transmits its benefits to the population.
• Third, the potential for economic growth and poverty reduction further depends on a household's private endowments. Households with larger private endowments-be it more and better qualified labor or land-not only tend to be less poor, they are also better placed to profit from new opportunities generated by liberalization and institutional change.
• Finally, it is vital to separate out the effect of shocks when assessing the role of policy changes. Dercon highlights rainfall and health shocks, both of which are certain to be 28 relevant to poor households in most African countries. The importance of health shocks is also underscored by Deininger and Okidi for the Ugandan case. Export commodity price fluctuations, though not explicitly treated in these studies, form another important risk factor.
We now examine the evidence on distribution and poverty changes in other countries covered in this review, looking for echoes of the findings from the panel data of Ethiopia and Uganda.
Distribution, poverty and liberalization
The changes in relative prices through exchange rate devaluations, the opening of domestic markets, and changes in the structure of production are certain to lead to shifts in income distribution, with producers of tradable goods (mostly exportables) benefiting directly from the economic policy reforms. The Ugandan and Ethiopian studies show that these effects were evident during the 1990s, and that they directly benefited poor households. The experience of Ghana in West Africa echoes these East African findings. Ghana experienced sharp poverty reductions among cash (export) crop producers during the 1990s, a result of more favorable world cocoa prices and an increase in cocoa production. Table 11 compares trends in poverty among crop producers in rural Uganda and Ghana. In both countries about two fifths of the population are food-producing farmers, of whom about two thirds were poor in the early 1990s. And in both countries, poverty fell among food producers, but the decline was not as great as that experienced by export crop producers. Most of the rural poor appear to have benefited from growth, but those producing export crops have benefited most. A much larger share of the population in Uganda grows cash crops (21 percent) than in Ghana (6 percent) which may explain the larger drop in poverty amongst food crop producers in Uganda. Reviewing the existing evidence on the experience with agricultural reforms in sub-Saharan Africa, Kherallah et al. (2000) arrive at a similar conclusion-export-crop producers seem to have benefited more than food crop producers. What needs to be better understood is the transmission mechanism that led to economic gains of households not producing for export.
Potential pathways include rural labor markets, with higher export crop prices stimulating export crop production leading to increased demand for agricultural wage labor and ultimately higher agricultural real wages. Abdulai and Delgado (2000) find that in Ghana a one percent change in the domestic terms of trade between agriculture and non-agriculture leads to a 0.83 percent change in the real agricultural wage rate in the long run, underscoring the importance of labor markets in transmitting the effects of economic reforms. Increased liquidity in rural economies from agricultural exports can also have important spin-off effects, through an expansion of both investment in export and food crop production, and increased consumption of goods and services produced with previously underutilized local labor, land or capital. As a rule of thumb Delgado et al. (1998) posit that any policy enhancing producers' income from agricultural exports increases local rural income by twice the amount of the increased exports.
To understand the different evolution in poverty among food-and cash-crop producers, it is important to keep in mind that the former group tends to be much more heterogeneous than the latter. In export-crop growing regions, the effects of favorable export crop pric es were transmitted to the food-crop growing households-either through the labor market or the input and product markets, or both. Transmission of such benefits to areas unsuitable for export crop production, especially when they are also remote, is much harder. For example, in Ghana food producers in more remote and less integrated regions (in the north) did not experience a similar reduction in their poverty as food growers in cash-crop (and better integrated) areas. Similarly, food crop producers in northern Uganda, which is also less accessible, appear not to have benefited from recent growth.
Periods of economic stagnation and recession also systematically affect some groups more than others. In Zimbabwe, for example, the increase in rural poverty during 1990/91 and 1995/96 was felt most keenly among the commercial farmers (Table 12 ). Disentangling exactly why some suffered more than others is a difficult undertaking. Some farmers might have suffered more than others from the drought (an issue taken up by Alwang, Mills and Taruvinga, 2002 and discussed below) . It is also likely that the fall in incomes among commercial farmers was due to the decline in real tobacco prices, estimated by Townsend (1999) to be -2.5 percent per annum during 1990
and 1996/97. Other features of real price changes during the period identified by Townsend (notably the increase in the real price of cotton and continued government intervention in the maize market) may also explain why the smallholder group of farmers have not suffered as much as the commercial farmers during this episode of drought and economic decline. 
Distribution, poverty and location
The panel analysis of Ethiopian and Ugandan households provides strong empirical evidence that location is important in determining how growth influences income distribution. Other countries also experienced strongly divergent patterns in inequality across regions. In Ghana, for example, inequality fell sharply in Accra, Urban Savannah, and Rural Forest, while it increased sharply in the Coastal zone and Rural Savannah. Our conclusion is that overall indices of inequality can mask important changes in distribution?particularly across and within geographic regions.
Geography is even more important in explaining poverty trends. In some countries the decline in poverty is observed in both the rural and urban areas (Uganda, Mauritania, Ghana- Table 13 ). In others, the change is confined mainly to urban areas (Zambia between 1991 (Zambia between -1996 . It is clear from the case studies that within both the rural and the urban sectors, poverty changes have varied considerably depending on geographical location. Some geographical areas have not benefited as much as others from growth, and some have even lost ground during the period of recovery. The different experience in the evolution of poverty seems closely related to the extent to which the region or village is integrated within the overall economy. The experiences of Ghana and Madagascar are illustrative. Poverty in Accra fell sharply, but not in other urban areas ( Figure 5 ). In the Savannah zone poverty increased in both urban and rural areas, and especially in the Northern Region and among subsistence farmers. 37 The fact that growth in Ghana saw aggregate poverty fall is very little comfort to food farmers and urban workers in the north of the country, who probably compare their fortunes with Accra residents. Important clues as to why Ghanaians in the north did not benefit from growth are found in recent papers by Badiane and Shively (1998) and Abdulai (2000) , which conclude that markets (more specifically the maize market) in the remoter Northern Region are not very well integrated with the economy at large. This lack of integration most likely impeded the transmission of the benefits of growth to the region. Source: 'Remoteness' is also important in understanding geographical differences in poverty outcomes in Madagascar. Paternostro, Razafindravonona and Stifel (2001) disaggregate poverty according to an index of remoteness, the latter being a weighted sum of indicators reflecting access to roads, bus stop, agricultural extension services, modern fertilizers, and distance to schools and health facilities (the weights were derived from factor analysis). Their findings (Table 14) indicate an association between the degree of remoteness and the likelihood of being in poverty. They also show that while rural poverty indicators were largely unchanged during 1997 and 1999, households assessed to be the most remote, experienced increased poverty-in contrast to the least remote quintile where poverty indicators actually improved. 
Distribution, poverty and private endowments
The experiences in Ethiopia and Uganda demonstrated that better-endowed households, particularly more educated households and those with more (fertile) land, were not only less likely to be poor, but also more likely to benefit from favorable changes in the macroenvironment. The importance of education for poverty reduction is echoed by the microeconometric evidence from Ghana, Madagascar, and Zimbabwe.
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Both in Ghana and Madagascar, real consumption levels increase with educational attainment. And the returns to education across the different education levels increased from the first to the second survey year.
These observations hold for both urban and rural areas. In Zimbabwe, a more precipitous increase in poverty following the economic decline was prevented because of previous investments in schooling that increased the educational attainment of the population in the 1990s (Alwang, Mills and Taruvinga, 2002) . That incomes fell and poverty increased despite household efforts to invest in human capital, assets and migration (see Figure 7 , panel B) can only be attributed to a reduction in the rates of return to these assets.
Evidence from Madagascar, the only other study which explicitly addresses the role of land holdings, confirms that consumption levels are higher for those who possess land, except for those with only a very small amount of land (less than 0.1 hectare per capita). Returns to land holdings also increase with the size of the plots owned. Returns to land holdings deteriorated from 1993 to 1999 for households with less than 0.4 hectares per capita, while they improved for those with more land. The changes in returns decreased poverty incidence among the latter group by 2 percentage points, while it increased poverty among the former by 0.82 percentage points. Paternostro, Razafindravonona and Stifel (2001) surmise that this difference follows from more extensive land use by smallholders in the face of demographic pressures forcing small farmers to expand their fields into less productive and more fragile areas. 38 One constraint these studies face is the absence of reliable price data (linked that is, to the household data), which would be needed to assess the direct impact of the reforms on consumption. Systematic changes in real producer prices are certain to have affected income distribution and poverty during this period. However, both the Madagascar and Zimbabwe studies control for rainfall shocks, an issue to which we return below.
Distribution, poverty and shocks
Poverty estimates provide a snapshot of the standard of living at a certain point in time and reflect both policy reforms as well as temporary external shocks such as droughts. When evaluating the evolution of poverty it is thus important to control for the effect of external shocks on comparative poverty figures. Controlling for all other factors, the Ethiopian panel analysis estimated that household income growth was reduced by about a fifth because of rainfall shortage (Dercon, 2002) . The role of rainfall variations in influencing household income growth was also an important feature of the Zimbabwean and Madagascar experience.
That poverty increased sharply in Zimbabwe during the 1990s is without question (Alwang, Mills and Taruvinga, 2002) . 
IV. Concluding remarks
The evidence of the 1990s gives ground for cautious optimism. In the aggregate at least, episodes of growth have been poverty reducing in Africa, and countries which have experienced a recovery in their macro-economic balances and the quality of their institutions have seen the numbers in poverty decline. But there are three serious qualifications. First, experiences have varied enormously. Some countries have enjoyed a decade of sustained growth, and others have had to cope with crisis and decline. In the eight countries covered by the Poverty Dynamics study, four experienced significant declines in poverty (Ethiopia, Ghana, Mauritania and Uganda), two faced sharp increases (Nigeria and Zimbabwe), and in two (Madagascar and Zambia) there was no discernable trend, the outcome depending on the specific circumstances (rainfall, terms of trade) of the survey years in question.
The second qualification derives from the need to go beyond the averages. While it is true that overall income distributions (evidenced by the Gini ratio) have not changed during African episodes of growth, and that such growth (or recession) can be characterized as pro-poor in this aggregate sense, this can be misleading. Beneath the aggregate numbers exists a variety of experience. Neglect of this reality by policymakers-and sometimes also academics-has often impeded a constructive and fruitful dialogue with 'civil society' about appropriate poverty reducing policies (Kanbur, 2001) . Third, the Poverty Dynamics work highlights the importance of takin g different perspectives of poverty. Although trends in human development indicators are generally consistent with economic well-being, their dynamics have been quite different in some countries. The multifaceted nature of poverty calls for multivariate approaches to tracking and understanding its dynamics.
Focusing on income poverty, our review of the evidence shows that there have been systematic changes in income distributions and poverty in the countries covered. We have identified some of the main contours of these distribution changes, and highlighted four key policy messages: the importance of economic reform and political stability for poverty reductio n; the role of location and remoteness in conditioning how the benefits of growth are distributed; the significance of private endowments (especially education and land) for the ability of households to take 37 advantage of new opportunities, and the consequent poverty outcomes; and finally the need to account for shocks in understanding distributional outcomes and poverty changes over time.
The 'emerging picture' described by Demery and Squire (1996) appears to be confirmed with the better data (reflecting also a longer time perspective than previous work). Improvements in the macroeconomic balances are associated with reductions in poverty in the region. There is also an emerging micro-picture concerning the consumption poverty impact of market liberalization. The analysis of household panel data by Dercon (2002) for Ethiopia and Deininger and Okidi (2001) for Uganda provide the most systematic and empirically convincing cases that policy-induced changes in relative prices can have poverty-reducing effects. Micro-evidence from Ghana provides some corroboration from West Africa.
The second policy message is the need for a geographical perspective on poverty. Whilst the various rounds of poverty assessments have established that the incidence of poverty varies considerably across different regions of a country, this recent work on poverty dynamics has shown that some regions, by virtue of their sheer remoteness, have been left behind somewhat as growth has picked up. Households with limited access to markets and public services have not benefited from growth during the 1990s. Public policy, and the provision of public goods (notably infrastructure services-from the Ethiopian case, especially roads and from the Ugandan case, electric ity) must address these fundamental regional inequalities.
Third, both education and access to land emerge as key private endowments to enable households to escape poverty. The importance of education for poverty reduction is brought out in all our case studies-in rural and urban areas-with the marginal returns to education typically increasing by educational attainment. While land redistributions may not be appropriate in all countries, as argued by Dercon (2002) for Ethiopia, it is ultimately the productive capacity of land which matters. A more efficient organization of agricultural services and agricultural inputs, such as fertilizer, could go a long way towards improving productivity of land (Kherallah et al., 1999) . 
Welfare Measurement
The welfare indicator commonly chosen was total household expenditure (Annex Table A2 ).
With the exception of urban Ethiopia, Madagascar and Nigeria, where total expenditures are computed on a per-capita basis, all studies used adult equivalence scales to account for household composition. In general, the guiding principle in the selection of items included in each expenditure measure was to ensure comparability over time. Therefore, only items common 44 across surveys and for which questions were asked in a similar fashion were retained. In some cases, like Zimbabwe, surveys maintained a common design over time, thus allowing for a wide coverage of household consumption expenditures including use of services, consumption values from assets owned and imputed values from gifts remittances and transfers received. However, there have been instances where this approach led to a more restrictive coverage of household expenditures. For example, in Madagascar, where survey design changed over time, items such as livestock auto-consumption, gifts, remittances and in-kind payments and auto-consumption from non-food enterprises were omitted so as to ensure proper comparability 40 .
In all cases, consumption included items where imputations were called for. These include imputed rent from owner-occupation, and imputed income from the consumption of food produced by the household. Methods of computing these imputations differed. Although consumption of own-produced food was included in all expenditure measures, for Ghana the authors used household self-estimation of the value of such items, while in Uganda the imputation was obtained using median unit values from household food purchases (i.e. market prices). Such procedures were applied consistently to data sets to preserve over-time comparability. But differences across countries would counsel caution in comparing results across countries.
There were also adjustments made to account for differences in prices, across both time and space. All studies computed total expenditures in real terms, where official price series have been used to express values in base year prices (Annex table A2 ). Moreover, with the exception of Zambia and Zimbabwe, regional and rural/urban price differences are also taken into account in the construction of the consumption measure.
Finally, Annex table A3 provides further detail on the computation of the macroeconomic policy scores used in the text. 40 Such items however, accounted for only 4.3 percent of total expenditure in 1993. The highest number of items omitted is found in Ethiopia (1989-95 rural panel) where only food expenditures were included. 
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